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National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion

This Space Policy Directive establishes a national strategy for developing and using space nuclear power and propulsion (SNPP) systems to advance U.S. space dominance. It sets four ambitious goals including lunar surface fission power demonstration, uranium fuel processing capabilities, nuclear thermal propulsion foundations, and advanced radioisotope power systems, with a coordinated roadmap targeting milestones through 2030.

Federal Register Open PDF 85 FR 82873

Impact dates

  1. NASA should initiate lunar fission surface power project

  2. Develop advanced RPS capabilities

  3. Demonstrate lunar surface fission power system (mid- to late-2020s)

  4. Develop uranium fuel processing capabilities (mid-2020s)

  5. Establish NTP technical foundations (late-2020s)

Key directives

  • Vice President shall coordinate U.S. SNPP policy through National Space Council
  • NASA should initiate lunar fission surface power project by 2027
  • DoD and NASA should provide mission needs to DOE for fuel identification
  • DOE shall maintain capability for space nuclear systems on full-cost recovery basis
  • Secretary of Energy authorized and directed to publish memorandum in Federal Register
  • Sponsoring agency must brief NSC, National Space Council, OSTP, and OMB before using HEU or non-LEU fuel

Who is ordered

Timeline

Immediate

  • Vice President to coordinate SNPP policy through National Space Council
  • Secretary of Energy authorized to publish memorandum in Federal Register

Near term (90d)

  • DoD and NASA to provide mission needs to DOE for fuel identification
  • Agency heads to begin coordinating among existing SNPP programs

Long term

  • By mid-2020s: develop uranium fuel processing capabilities
  • By 2027: NASA to initiate lunar fission surface power project
  • By mid- to late-2020s: demonstrate lunar surface fission power system
  • By late-2020s: establish NTP technical foundations
  • By 2030: develop advanced RPS capabilities

Risks & tensions

  • Use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) creates nuclear nonproliferation and security tensions despite 'limited to' language
  • Multiple agency coordination (NASA, DoD, DOE, DOC, DOT, NRC) risks bureaucratic friction
  • Subject to availability of appropriations creates funding uncertainty for ambitious timeline
  • International cooperation goals may conflict with security principles for sensitive nuclear technology
  • Private-sector engagement mandates may clash with national security asset protection requirements
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